The foundation proved illusory. US certifier DeGolyer & MacNaughton estimated 28.7 TCF of proven reserves in 2003, expanding to 52 TCF including probable reserves. Ryder Scott’s 2009 recertification slashed this figure to 9.94 TCF in what researcher Mirko Orgaz, author of “Nacionalización, historia y poder del petróleo,” terms a “reality check.” Orgaz attributes the initial inflated figures to manipulation aimed at revaluing shares of companies investing heavily during Bolivia’s neoliberal era from 1982 to 2005. Current reserves stand at just 3.7 TCF as of April 2026.
Gas exports have declined nearly 60% over the past decade, creating severe foreign currency shortages that contributed to month-long protests besieging La Paz. The crisis intensified in February 2026 when poor-quality gasoline distribution damaged thousands of vehicles weeks after President Rodrigo Paz eliminated fuel subsidies.
Former Hydrocarbon Minister Álvaro Ríos, who served during the 2003-2004 transition from private operators including Repsol and Petrobras to state control, reports that a 60% tax burden established during his tenure funded fuel subsidies for vehicles and thermal power plants. Between 2005 and 2017, 66% of hydrocarbon revenues went to current expenditures rather than exploration investment, according to independent analysis.
The belief in abundant gas reserves led to overexploitation of existing fields while new exploration ceased. With 70% of Bolivia’s electricity generation dependent on natural gas, infrastructure vulnerabilities now extend beyond fuel supplies to potential grid failures, marking a complete reversal from the energy sovereignty promised a decade earlier.
This article was curated and published as part of our South American energy market coverage.
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